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Abstract
In this thesis we introduce and solve three privacy problems in Secure Database
Access protocols: Database Privacy, the Data Replication Problem, and the Secure
user Identity problem. Database Privacy is concerned with keeping the databases
information secure from the user. The Data Replication problem (DRP) deals with
a new security concern for databases that emanates from the need to replicate and
distribute their contents in order to achieve security for the user. The Secure user ID
problem is concerned with keeping private the user's identity, so that no information
can be associated with or learned about that identity.
Our results rely on an existing Private Information Retrieval scheme which achieves
privacy for the user's query by relying on the multiple database model. This model
allows for information theoretic results and sublinear communication complexity in
the size of the database. We present two schemes which solve, in addition to what
was achieved previously, Database Privacy and the Data Replication problem.
We achieve two different degrees of security for DRP. The first one is private-data-
distribution which means that all the databases in the scheme are k-wise independent
for some constant k. The second is no-data-distribution security which means that
the database's in the scheme contain data that is completely independent. The user's
security in our scheme relies on the Private Information Retrieval scheme introduced
in [14] which guaranties that the message the user sends to a database is uniformly
distributed over all possible queries.
We show two reductions:
Theorem: For any k > 2 given any Private Information Retrieval k-database
scheme for n data bits with communication complexity R(k, n) there exists a private-
data-distribution and database private 2k-database scheme with communication com-
plexity O(R(k, n) log(n)) where each database holds O(n) bits.
Theorem: For any k > 2 given any retrieval k-database scheme for n data bits with
communication complexity R(k, n) there exists a no-data-distribution and database
private 2k-database scheme with communication complexity O(R(k, n) log(n)) where
each database holds O(n) bits.
Secure ID
In addition, we solve the Secure ID problem by presenting a protocol for a network
of a user U, n databases of size m with an additional server S. A database in the
network does not know whether U asked him a query or asked a query from another
database. Therefore, we say that he does not know the identity of the users that are
querying him. The communication complexity of that scheme is O(log(n)R(n, kl) +
log(m)R(m, k2)) for constants k1 and k2.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis we introduce and solve three privacy problems in secure database access
protocols: Database Privacy, the Data Replication Problem (DRP), and the Secure
User Identity problem. Database Privacy is concerned with keeping the databases
information secure from the user. The Data Replication problem deals with a new
security concern for databases that emanates from the need to replicate and distribute
their contents in order to achieve security for the user. The Secure User ID problem
is concerned with keeping private the user's identity, so that no information can be
associated with or learned about that identity. But before we are able to discuss these
problems further, let us give some background and motivation as to what brings forth
these database security problems.
Since the propagation of the World Wide Web users grew to expect almost all
types of data to be available on the internet. In many cases, information that cannot
be found on the web is considered non existent. Therefore, even databases that
contain sensitive information find it necessary to make their data available on the
web. Access to this sensitive information introduces a privacy risk not only to the
database, but to the user as well, because the database can electronically record the
user's identity and the type and contents of the user's query. This is not the case
for data retrieved by users from books in libraries, for example, because there is no
electronic trace or record of the page the user accessed, or of the user's identity.
Therefore, this new internet scenario brings forth the problem of Secure Data Access,
which is concerned with keeping private the users's query, the user's identity, and the
database's information other than the value of a particular query that is offered to
the user.
Previously, work was done on protecting databases from the access of malicious
users who destroy contents [21, 2]. This work, however, was not concerned with
the user's security at all. Recently, a solution to protect only the user's privacy was
proposed and called Private Information Retrieval [14]. Private Information Retrieval
protects the user from the database by giving the database no knowledge about the
type or value of the user's query. Those results are achieved using a multiple database
model, in which a user obtains the value of his query by communicating with a few
copies of the database as opposed to only one. However, the databases holding copies
of the data, are not allowed to communicate amongst themselves, in order to keep
the user's query private.
We would like to offer some motivation for why the Databases Security and Private
Information Retrieval must be satisfied simultaneously. We observe that security for
both the user and the database is crucial for the emerging applications of today's
world. For example, consider an investor who decides on a stock based on information
he receives from a database containing stock information. In this scenario, it is
likely, that the user wishes to keep his choice of stock, or query, secret while the
database itself would like to keep the stock information private to itself, except for
the particular stock that the user has paid for. Therefore, the security of both should
not be compromised.
The first goal of this thesis was to simultaneously satisfy these two problems in
the multiple database model. Let us examine the plausibility of the multiple database
model. In general it contains many databases that are not communicating with each
other, and only the user talks to each one separately. In the Private Information
Retrieval scheme [14] the contents of all the databases are identical and are created
by replicating the original database. Later, the auxiliary databases holding the dis-
tributed copies are assumed not to communicate with the original database. This
assumption seems implausible to us because according to it the database, in a sense,
gives its information to parties which can use it to create their own database black
market service and sell the data independently. There is little that can be done by the
database to prevent this from happening since those other parties must be separate
entities with which it is not allowed to communicate. If the database cannot be secure
about its data then it is not likely to agree to participate in a Private Information
Retrieval protocol and then the user is at risk. Thus we are faced with a new problem:
how to prevent the databases from being copied to non communicating entities in the
multiple database model which is essential for achieving user privacy. We call it the
"Data Replication Problem".
In this thesis we present schemes that solve the "Data Replication Problem" and
"Database Privacy" while maintaining all the other properties accomplished by a Pri-
vate Information Retrieval scheme. The novel idea in those schemes is to construct
auxiliary databases that contain data which is independent of the original data yet
gives the user the appropriate value that will help construct his query. In other words,
we propose a protocol for communication between a user, a database and auxiliary
databases whose contents are not dependent on the original database. This protocol
allows the user to keep his query secret from the databases, and allows the database
to keep its data secret from the auxiliary databases and from the user (except for the
value of the particular query). Then we will show how to extend that scheme into a
protocol for a network of databases that solves the Secure ID problem. Those pro-
tocols rely on no cryptographic assumptions and maintain sublinear communication
complexity in the size of the database, where by communication complexity we mean
the total bits sents between all the parties per query.
We note that the Database Privacy concern was addressed previously in [7], but
this work did not allow for a constant number of databases, and one round of com-
putation. No work was previously done towards the Data Replication Problem. All
information theoretic multi database schemes never required nor achieved that the
databases will be independent. The general multi party computation protocols can be
used toward solving the problem with auxiliary databases with independent contents,
but then the communication complexity is very high. In addition, those schemes re-
quire many rounds of computation, and a non constant number of auxiliary databases.
Our scheme is the first that is explicitly concerned with the Data Replication prob-
lem and that solves it with information theoretic security, sublinear communications
complexity, a constant number of auxiliary databases and 1 round of communication.
The third problem is the Secure User ID problem which is concerned with keep-
ing private the user's identity, so that no information can be associated with or
learned about that identity. Not much work has been done in order to solve the
Secure ID problem. There is, however, a sight in Carnegie Mellon University called
anonymizer which allows one to "surf the web without revealing any personal in-
formation". It is currently restricted to Carnegie Mellon Computer Science sites.
The URL for this page is Http://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu:8080/ maintained by Justin
Boyan (jab@cs.cmu.edu). Still, the privacy of the user on this site is conditional on
the fact that the user trusts this particular anonymizer server since this server itself
can obtain information about the user when the user surfs through it.
1.1 Our Results:
We present two schemes which solve Database Privacy, the Data Replication problem,
while also achieving User Privacy, no cryptographic assumptions, a constant number
of databases, and sublinear communication complexity.
More specifically, we present two schemes which solve the Data Replication Prob-
lem (DRP) achieving two different degrees of security. The first one achieves private-
data-distribution which means that all the databases in the scheme are k-wise indepen-
dent for some constant k. The second scheme achieves no-data-distribution security
which means that the databases in the scheme contain data that is completely in-
dependent. Both achieve Database Privacy as well which means that after the user
interacts with all the databases, he does not get any information about the database,
except for its value at a single location. The user's security in our schemes relies on
the Private Information Retrieval scheme introduced in [14] which guaranties that
the message the user sends to a database is uniformly distributed over all possible
queries.
We show two reductions:
Theorem: For any k > 2 given any Private Information Retrieval k-database
scheme for n data bits with communication complexity R(k, n) there exists a private-
data-distribution and database private 2k-database scheme with communication com-
plexity O(R(k, n) log(n)) where each database holds O(n) bits.
Theorem: For any k > 2 given any retrieval k-database scheme for n data bits with
communication complexity R(k, n) there exists a no-data-distribution and database
private 2k-database scheme with communication complexity O(R(k, n) log(n)) where
each database holds O(n) bits.
Remarks:
In all the schemes there is a trade off between increasing the number of databases
and the number of faulty databases who in a coalition could break security.
If we use the [3] scheme, then R(n, k) = n1/2k-1
Secure ID
In addition, we solve the Secure ID problem by presenting a protocol for a network
which consists of a user U, n databases of size m with an additional server S. A
database in the network does not know whether U asked him a query or asked a
query from another database. Therefore, we say that he does not know the identity
of the users that are querying him. The communication complexity of that scheme is
O(log(n)R(n, kl) + log(m)R(m, k2)) for constants k1 and k2.
1.2 Outline of Thesis.
Since our results for the Secure ID problem largely rely on the results of the Data
Replication Problem, we begin by describing previous work related to the Data Repli-
cation problem in chapter 2. Then, chapter 3 will describe the security notions, as-
sumptions, and protocols used in our schemes. In chapters 4 and 5, we describe two
schemes that together achieve Database Privacy and Private Data Distribution. In
chapter 6, we describe a scheme that satisfies an even stronger security requirement,
No Data Distribution, and protect the database from distributing its data. Then, we
discuss the similarity between our problem and the Oblivious Transfer problem, in
chapter 7. In chapter 8, we present a scheme which solves the Secure ID problem.
Finally we offer some suggestions for future work in chapter 9.
Chapter 2
Previous Work
In this chapter we concentrate on the database's security, meaning Database Privacy
and the Data Replication Problem, since our solution to it is a subprotocol of the
Secure ID solution. In addition, there is not much work done on the Secure ID
problem other than the site we mentioned in the introduction.
The new problem of Data Replication (DRP) originates in a multiple database
model and is concerned with the distribution of original data to non communicating
parties. If this problem arises in this model than why use this model at all, or what
are the properties of this model that make it so desirable? In order to explain that, let
us first state the properties we would like our model to satisfy. Having this as a goal
in mind, we will go through various models explored in previous work and find the
best match with our properties. One of the models that we examine is the multiple
database model with databases of feasible size introduced in the PIR scheme [14]
which satisfies all of our desired properties except for Database Privacy and DRP.
In the rest of the thesis we will present various schemes that solve Database Privacy
and DRP in this model.
2.1 Our Goals
The main goal of our work is to provide privacy for the user while not compromising
the database's security. This means that the user is the only one who knows the value
of his query, and that the database is the only one who knows the data. In order
to make the solution stronger we require no cryptographic assumptions. In addition,
we insist on low communication complexity and a constant number of databases
otherwise the solution would be too costly and make no sense in the context of our
application.
More formally our desired properties can be described as follows:
* Security for the Database from the auxiliary databases - For databases D 1, D2 , ... , Dk.
D 1 contains the original database, and the rest of the databases Di for i : 1 con-
tain data whose distribution is independent of D. Therefore, a single database
having only the view of Di, without communicating with other databases, can-
not get any information about D.
* Security for the Database from the user - After the user interacts with all the
databases, D 1 , ..., Dk, the user does not get any information about D, except
for its value at a single location (presumably bq). That is, the view that the
user gets is independent of the values in D in indices i : q.
* Security for the user - Private Information Retrieval - No database communi-
cating with the user can get any information about the user's query q, or the
value at q. That is, all the communication between the user and the particular
database is distributed uniformly, for all indices.
* No computational assumptions - Information Theoretic Security - No matter
how much computational power a party has it cannot gain any knowledge from
the information that it has.
* Communication complexity: The total number of bits exchanged between the
user and all the databases per query is sublinear in the size of the database.
* All of the above properties can be achieved with a constant number of databases.
k is a constant.
2.2 Overview Of Previous Work
Having stated our goals, we proceed by giving an overview of the different models
used in previous work. The models are illustrated through the schemes that use
them, where the schemes are interactive protocols between a database (or a party
with information) and a user (a party that wants to get a piece of information). We
examine the achievement of each protocol in light of our goals and then relate these
to the properties of the model they use.
2.2.1 The One Database Model - Oblivious Transfer
We start with the simplest and most intuitive model - the one database model -
which consists of a database and a user, because it immediately eliminates the Data
Replication problem. This model is used in the Oblivious Transfer protocol [11, 12,
20, 15, 8, ?] where the database is a party called Alice who has the secret S and the
user is a party called Bob who wants to obtain the secret. After the protocol Bob
either receives the bit S with probability 1/2 or Bob gains no further information
about the value of S. Alice does not know which of the events occurred. This basic
Oblivious Transfer was introduced by Rabin for the purpose of exchanging secrets and
was later extended to the (') OT in which Alice has two secrets S 1 and So, while Bob
has a bit b. At the end of the protocol Bob has Sb and knows nothing about Sl-b, and
Alice does not know b. Furthermore, OT was extended to an even more general form
in which Alice has n secrets S1, ...Sn and bob has an index i in n. At the end of the
protocol Bob has Si and nothing more than that, while Alice does not know anything
about i. This achieves security for both Alice and Bob. The extended version of
the Oblivious Transfer protocol found other applications such as a subprotocol for a
multi party computations which only used n as a constant of at most four. Therefore,
there was no need to worry about the high communication complexity of the protocol
O(n * securityparameter).
However in our application for the Oblivious Transfer protocol with the size of
the database n being polynomial, communication complexity of order n is too large
to be reasonable. So the Oblivious Transfer protocol does not match our goals in
that respect. Actually the Oblivious Transfer protocol does not match our goals in
another respect as well. The OT protocol also relies on computational assumptions,
whereas we are interested in information theoretic security. This property is not only
a property of the protocol but it is inherent in the one database model because both
parties have the whole transcripts of the conversation so that nothing is hidden from
them. Therefore we will have to examine other models in order to satisfy all of our
goals. But before that, let us summarize the properties of the one database model.
Model - One database and one user. The properties of the protocols that were
implemented using this model so far achieve the following properties.
* User privacy.
* Database Privacy and No Data Distribution.
* Requires only 1 Database.
Note that it does not achieve:
* Information theoretic security because it relies on the existence of Trapdoor
functions.
* Reasonable communication complexity: The communication complexity is O(n*
k) where k is a security parameter.
Non Interactive OT
An interesting variation of the OT protocol which tries to reduce the cost of communi-
cation is the Non Interactive OT [8] which introduces a variation of the one database
model. This protocol reduces the cost of Oblivious Transfer not by lowering the
communication complexity but by eliminating the interactive step. The traditional
OT requires the following interactive step: first the user sends n trap door functions
to the database knowing the trap door information to only one of them, then the
database applies the function to his secrets and sends the results to the user. The
non interactive OT modifies the one databases model to include a public file as well.
Using this public file the interactive step is removed by having the user choose his
trapdoor functions ahead of time and place them in the public file. Having access to
the public file, the database could send messages to the user at a convenient time for
him. The keys placed in a public file can be used for many or different applications.
This application is also useful for fractional OT where a user obtains only a fraction
of the messages sent to him during the protocol. However, the Non Interactive OT
still makes cryptographic assumptions which we would like to avoid.
2.2.2 Software Protection - Oblivious RAM
Another model we consider is the model used in the Oblivious RAM protocol which
is proposed in [17] for the software protection problem. This problem is not con-
cerned with the copying of software, rather it is concerned with hiding the software
program's access pattern to the memory. Meaning that the access should be uni-
formly distributed over all locations in memory. This problem cannot be solved by
encryption alone because it does not hide everything, for example accesses to the
same location. The Oblivious RAM protocol solves this software protection problem
and produces interaction between the CPU and the memory such that the software
holder who views this interaction has no information about the software. Meaning
that the interaction, or access pattern, seems independent of the software.
The model of this program consists of two parties the CPU and the software
holder. (Note that the software holder can also be called a user or one who buys
the software, but in this case we choose not to call him a user because in this thesis
we limit the term user only to those who access databases in order to get some
information and here the software holder holds the software or information and does
not query it and thus he is not a user in our sense). The CPU holds the input to the
software according to which the program will run. The CPU is protected by hardware
therefore its size is limited and it cannot hold the contents of the software's memory.
Therefore, the memory must be first encrypted and permuted by the CPU and then
stored by the Software Holder. Thus, the software holder knows about all the accesses
to the memory. The software holder in a sense stores the CPU as well but since the
CPU is protected by hardware, the software holder does not have any information
about it. The CPU is the only one who has all the permutation and decryption keys
to the memory.
Having set the model, let us describe in more detail what was achieved in the
Oblivious RAM protocol and how it pertains to our application. When a memory is
encrypted and permuted, it does not reveal which specific address is accessed or what
was the contents of it. However, it does reveal information about the access pattern
such as which address is accessed more than once and in what order that occurs.
Through the Oblivious RAM protocol the CPU can communicate with the memory
such that the software holder does not gain this information. In fact, the interaction
is such that it is indistinguishable from an interaction of another software. This is
achieved using cryptographic assumptions and amortized polylogarithmic communi-
cation complexity in the size of the program.
We do not describe how the protocol is implemented here. Rather we concentrate
on examining the parallels between this model and the database model and using
ideas from the Oblivious RAM protocol for solutions in our schemes.
Let us then describe the similarities between the models. In the database model
there is a database with n bits of information and a user who wishes to retrieve
some of that information without giving away its query. In the software protection
model there is a software holder who has encrypted and permuted memory and a
CPU who wants to access that memory without revealing its access pattern. Those
two problems are the same, except that the software holder does not know the real
contents and addresses of the memory and the Database does have the real data and
thus also knows the values and real locations of each query (not only the repeated
ones). In our scheme if we find a way to encrypt and permute the database without
giving the database the encryption and permutation keys while not compromising
the database's security, we can use the Oblivious RAM method of access to achieve
privacy for the user. We will describe this in more detail when we describe the actual
scheme in Chapter 6.
2.2.3 Multi Prover Scheme
All the models we examined so far were variations of the one database models which
achieved their security by relying on cryptographic assumptions. Those results are
actually inherent in the one database model because it is impossible to obtain an
information theoretic two party protocol that does not disclose the secrets of the other
party because the two parties have exactly the whole transcript of their conversation
[18]. Since we want to achieve information theoretic results we proceed by examining
models that involve more than one database. This way, one database alone does not
have the whole transcript of the conversation, and therefore, cannot compute all the
information by itself. This means that the communication between the databases
must be limited, otherwise a database could obtain the whole transcript. Adding a
database does increase the cost of the protocol in terms of space but it is a worthwhile
price to pay for information theoretic security, especially since the distribution of data
is inherent in the current systems setting of the internet.
The first scheme to introduce and use the idea of distributing one of the protocol's
parties into two separate ones in order to achieve information theoretic results was the
Multi Prover Scheme [9]. The motivation for this scheme comes from an interactive
proof system which consists of an all powerful prover who attempts to convince a
probablistic polynomial time bounded verifier of the truth of a proposition. The
prover and the verifier receive a common input and can exchange upto a polynomial
number of messages, at the end of which the verifier either accepts or rejects the
input. In a zero-knowledge interactive proof the prover is trying to convey a proof
to the verifier without giving him any more knowledge. Such computationally zero-
knowledge interactive proof system were shown to exist by [16] for every NP language
if non-uniform one way functions exist. In the one prover model it was not possible
to achieve information theoretic results as we explain before. However, in the multi
prover model in which two provers were used instead of one it was shown that a
perfect zero knowledge interactive proof system exists for every NP language making
no intractability assumptions.
Let us describe the multi prover model in more detail. In their model there is still
one verifier. The two provers can decide on an optimal strategy before interacting
with the verifier. But once the interaction starts they can no longer send each other
messages. In addition, the two provers share either a polynomially long random pad
or a function which they can compute but the polynomially bounded verifier cannot.
One of the Provers' function is to give the proof. The other Prover's function is to
periodicly output segments of the random pad he shares with the other Prover.
Inspired by this model we proceed to examine distributed database models which
can achieve information theoretic results. We cannot use the Multi Prover scheme
directly because its provers specialize in proving propositions and in our case we are
interested in a party that holds data and gives pieces of that data to a user upon
request. Another difference between the schemes is that they show that adding more
provers does not add power to the multi prover model. In our case though, we show
that if we have more databases we can reduce the communication complexity further.
2.2.4 Multi Party Computation
Since the multi prover model is specificly designed for proof systems we must examine
a more general model designed for computing all functions, introduced in the Multi
Party Computation protocol. This model consists on n parties that are equally pow-
erful, yet they must cooperate in a computation because none of them alone have all
of the necessary information. Each party does not want to disclose its information;
therefore some security must be guarantied. Again, using the fact that the parties are
distributed and not communication outside of the protocols specification it is possi-
ble to obtain a multi party computations for any function with information theoretic
security [10].
The model of computation is a complete synchronous network of n processors.
The pairwise communication channels between players are secure. In one round of
computation each of the players can do an arbitrary amount of local computation,
send a message to each of the players, and read all messages that were sent to it. For
simplicity, they restrict themselves to the computation probablistic functions f from
n inputs to n outputs. The player i holds the i-th input at the start of computation,
and should obtain the i-th output at the end, but nothing else.
What happens when the parties do not follow the protocol and they communicate
outside of the permitted messages? (This was not the problem for the multi prover
scheme because there the parties do not communicate at all so it is easier to verify that
they are not communicating forbidden information). In this work, they allow for two
types of faulty parties. A party can either try to learn more by sharing information
that it receive through extra communication additional to the specified protocol, or
by using a completely different protocols altogether. It is shown in [10] that for every
probabilistic function and for every t < n/3 there exists a protocol that allows for no
more than t faulty parties of each kind that was just described. They achieve those
results by using constructions based on Algebraic Coding Theory, particularly the
use of general BCH codes.
This result is general for any probablistic function and for many parties that are
all interested in finding some value of the function. In our application we are dealing
with a special case where the function is a database and the user is the only party
who gets the value of the computation. Since their result is general they are not
able to achieve the number of databases, communication complexity, and rounds of
computation which we desire.
2.2.5 Multi Oracle Model - Instance Hiding
A more specific scheme for multi party computation is the Instance Hiding scheme
[1, 4, 5]. This scheme assumes the following model: for some function f (could be
exponential) and n parties, n - 1 of the parties (thought of as oracles) contain the
same data of how to evaluate f, while the n'th party (user) on private input x wishes
to compute f(x) but is unable to do so without the help of the n - 1 parties. The
Oracles are not allowed to communicate with one another, but only with the user.
Based on this model, Instance Hiding gives an interactive protocol involving a
computationally limited user (verifier) U and m > 1 powerful Oracles D 1, ..., Dn. For
a given exponential function f accessible only to the oracles, and input i E {1, ..., n},
accessible only to the user, outputs xi to the user only, while requiring only polynomial
communication complexity.
The protocol allows U to obtain the value of f(i) without revealing to any database
any information about i, thus achieving our security demands for the user. One
attempt to provide security for the database using the Instance Hiding scheme is
show in [7] using a proof system. In that work they use a proof system which gives
the user zero knowledge about f with only a small increase in cost. This achieves
Data Privacy. However, the data replication problem is not solved because all the
databases know the same information, f. In addition, another one of our goals -
a constant number of databases - is not solved because this scheme requires the
number of databases to be logarithmic in the size of the function in order for the
communication complexity to be low.
Model: There are k = O(log(n)) databases D 1, ..., Dk where n is exponential and a
user U. D therefore is an oracle which helps U the user compute a value. The D's are
not allowed to communicate. The properties of the protocols that were implemented
using this model so far achieve:
* User privacy.
* Privacy is information theoretic.
* Communication Complexity is O(log(n)).
Note that it does not solve:
* Data Privacy.
* The Data Replication problem.
* Constant number of databases. The number is O(log(n))
This number of databases result is appropriate for the general goal of the Instance
Hiding protocol, which is designed for a user (Verifier) which has the data necessary
(i) and needs to communicate with other processors (the computationally unbounded
databases) because it lacks the power to carry out the computation on its own. Thus
the Instance Hiding scheme is also beneficial for users who want the value of an
exponential function and only have polynomial power. But our specific application of
database access does not benefit from that case because our f is polynomial and can
be described as (f(i, xl, ... , xn) = i). Therefore, we can look at a more specific model
which is not general for all functions but only applies to the database function.
2.2.6 Multi Database Model - Private Information Retrieval
A more specific variation on the multiple oracle model of Instance Hiding is the model
of multiple databases of feasible size, introduced in the Private Information Retrieval
protocol [14]. The PIR scheme is a protocol for communication between a user and
multiple databases of feasible size which are not allowed to communicate between
themselves but with which the user communicates in order to obtain his query. Based
on this model the PIR protocol achieves information theoretic security for the user,
sublinear communication complexity, and a constant number of databases.
In this protocol they were able to reduce the number of databases to a constant by
changing the Instance Hiding model to include databases of a feasible size instead of
exponential size. Thus, the Private Information Retrieval protocol is not constructed
for the purpose of helping a user compute a value of any function with the help of
all powerful databases, but it is constructed for querying a feasible database for the
value of a special purpose type of function (f(i, xl, ..., zn) = i) in a secure manner
and low cost.
The Private Information Retrieval scheme copies database to other entities and
forbids their communication. Therefore, we are still left with the Data Replication
problem, and Data Privacy.
Model: k > 2 copies of the Database which is of a feasible size, and a user. The
databases are not allowed to communication with one another and are not allowed
to view the interaction of the user with the other databases either. The properties
of the protocols that were implemented using this model so far achieve the following
properties.
* User Privacy.
* Constant number of databases.
* Privacy is information theoretic.
* Communication Complexity - O(n 1/ (l + k )) for k = 2 and O(nl/ k) for k > 2.
Note that it does not solve the Data Replication problem, and does not achieve
Database Privacy.
In the rest of the thesis we will show how to solve the rest of our goals and use
PIR as a subprotocol in order to achieve its other properties as well.
2.3 Summary - The Model We Choose
Having examined different possible models and schemes we note that the model of
the Private Information Retrieval scheme achieves goals most similar to ours. In
other words, a model involving a user and feasible databases which are not allowed
to communicate allows for protocols which achieve all of our goals except for the
Data Replication problem and Data Privacy. Therefore, in this thesis we will present
schemes that solve these problems in that model. Our schemes are a reduction to the
Private Information Retrieval scheme. We use PIR as a subprotocol of our schemes.
In some cases we also rely on results from Oblivious RAM.
2.4 Related Work
In this section we describe work that is related to our work, but was achieved inde-
pendently from our results.
Private Information Storage
Ostrovsky and Shoup [19] have extended the results of [14] and designed schemes
for private information storage. Using their schemes, the user can both read and
write to the database without revealing which bit is accessed. They have shown that
any protocol for private information retrieval can be transformed to the protocol for
private information storage with a slight increase in the number of databases and
communication.
Private Information for the user [3]:
In this work the results of the PIR scheme introduced in [14] were improved by
achieving communication complexity of O(n1/(2k-1)). This was achieved through con-
structing a new scheme from two PIR schemes one for k = 2 databases and another
for k > 2 databases such that the k > 2 scheme is a subprotocol for the k = 2 scheme.
Computational Private Information Retrieval [13]:
In this work they show how to achieve PIR based on computational assumptions such
that the communication complexity can be O(n~) for any e > 0.
Chapter 3
Preliminaries and Notation
3.1 Model
Multi Database Model
The model of computation of all the schemes consists of original data D which con-
tains n bits, D = {bl,..., b,b, were n is a feasible parameter, k multiple databases
D 1, ..., Dk, and a user U. U has a query q E {1, ..., n}. D 1, ... , Dk consist of different
values depending on the scheme, they can either consist of D, or some random data.
The user, U, interacts with D1, ..., Dk while the D's are not allowed to communicate.
Network Model
The model of the network consists of n different original databases of length m, 2n
databases of random bits, 2n permutation databases, a server S, and a user. Each
group of 1 original database 2 random databases and 2 permutations are assigned a
location by the server. The databases and the server are not allowed to communicate.
3.2 Notions of Security
We are concerned with the following notions of privacy.
User Privacy: No database communicating with the user can get any information
about the user's query q, or the value bq. That is, all the communication between the
user and the particular database is distributed uniformly, for all indices.
Database Privacy: After the user interacts with all the databases, D1, ..., Dk, the user
does not get any information about D, except for its value at a single location (pre-
sumably bq). That is, the view that the user gets is independent of the values in D
in indices i : q.
Private Data Distribution: Only D1 has a copy of the original data D. The rest
of the databases Di for i - 1 contain data whose distribution is independent of D.
Therefore, a single database having only the view of Di, without communicating with
other databases, cannot get any information about D.
No Data Distribution: Only D1 has a copy of the original data D. The rest of the
databases Di for i : 1 can be determined ahead of time and contain some random
data that is determined independently of D. This privacy is different than the Pri-
vate Data Distribution above because in Private Data Distribution even though each
database Di on its own is independent of D, a coalition of databases can be dependent
on D, whereas here any coalition that does not contain D1 is independent of D.
Secure ID: No database in the network can get any information about which database
the user is querying. That is, all the communication between the user and the
databases is distributed uniformly for all databases.
3.3 Assumptions
There are two types of assumptions we make about the databases. One is concerned
with their faultiness. The second is concerned with the amount of communication we
allow them to have with each other.
Faultiness of the Databases:
Faultiness only pertains to whether the database follows the protocol or not, and it
is not concerned with extra messages that the databases might send.
Honest but curious: The databases and the user are following the specification
of the protocol exactly but try to extract as much knowledge as they can from the
information that they receive.
Malicious: The databases do not follow the protocol and send some other message
instead of the one that they were supposed to.
Communication:
The databases are not allowed to communicate with one another, where by commu-
nication we mean two different things: No messages, and No communication.
No messages: The databases are not allowed to send extra messages outside of
the specification of the protocol to another databases. This assumption can be re-
laxed by increasing the number of databases and then allowing certain databases to
communicate as long as a coalitions of a certain size will not form.
No communication: The databases are not allowed to talk to another database
at all by any means of communication, not only through extra messages but also
through pretending to be a user and following the user's protocol.
3.4 Protocols
We describe here two schemes, Oblivious Transfer [11], [15], [8] which we will show
to be equivalent to our problem in chapter 7, and the Private Information Retrieval
scheme [14] scheme, which we use in our schemes as a subprotocol.
3.4.1 Oblivious Transfer
(') Oblivious Transfer: In this protocol, Alice has n secret bits S1,..., S, and
Bob has a selection index i E {1,..., n}. At the end of the protocol, the following
three conditions hold.
1. Bob learns the i'th secret Si.
2. Bob gains no further information about the other secrets Sj for j 5 i.
3. Alice learns nothing about the value of i.
A general (n) oblivious transfer protocol based on the existence of one way func-
tions is described in Goldreich's notes [15].
3.4.2 Private Information Retrieval
The PIR scheme is an interactive protocol between a user and multiple databases
of feasible size which are not allowed to communicate between themselves but with
which the user communicates in order to obtain his query. The databases obtain no
information about the user's query, because the messages the user sends them are
uniformly distributed over all queries.
In [14] a few schemes are described.
* A scheme for k = 2 databases with communication complexity of O(n1 /3).
* A scheme for k (constant) databases with communication complexity of O(nl/k).
* A scheme for k = O(log(n)) databases with communication complexity of
O(log2(n) log log(n)).
In [3] a scheme is described that achieves communication complexity of O(n1/(2k -1))
for k databases.
For the remainder of the thesis we will denote the communication complexity of
the Private Information Retrieval scheme as CCPIR(n, k).
Here we describe the simplest scheme of [14] k = 2 databases, which suffices for
explaining the technique used to keep the user's request secret. To start with, this
simpler version is not better than the trivial O(n) solution (of sending the whole
database to the user), but after small modifications using error correction codes it
achieves communication complexity of O(n3).
In this simple example there are two databases D1, D2 and a user U.
At setup time:
* The database D = (bl, ..., bn) is duplicated into two identical copies D 1, and D 2
both contain the data values bl, ..., b,.
On Line: At this stage D1 and D2 are not allowed to communicate with one another.
* The user U is interested in the value of the query q E {1, ..., n} an index of the
database.
* U chooses at random a subset S of indices j E {1, .., n}. U then sends the
subset S to D1 and S' = S G q to D2, where Se a = {iS(:\ if aES
* D 1 sends to U the XOR of the values at the indices in S, meaning ejES bj
* D2 sends to U the XOR of the values at the indices in S'
* U XORs both of the values he has received from D1 and D2 and produces bq,
the qth value.
Neither D1 nor D2 can obtain any information about q from S, a uniformly dis-
tributed subset of n over all choices of indices.
Note that the databases are not allowed to talk to one another, otherwise they
could find q trivially.
Again the scheme we just described with only two databases is O(n) (the size of
the subset S) communication complexity. However, as it is shown in [14] it is possible
to restrict the subsets S that U chooses and to treat D1 and D2 as if they where 8
databases, thus reducing the complexity of communication to O(n1 /3 ).
Chapter 4
Random Pointer Scheme-
Protecting the Privacy of the
Database
In this chapter we present the Random Pointer scheme which guaranties Data Pri-
vacy. The security of the Random Pointer scheme is information theoretic and the
communication complexity is O(log(n) * t * CCPIR(n, k)) where CCPIR(n, k) is the
communication complexity of the PIR scheme with k databases of size n.
Before we present the scheme which achieves Data Privacy, we explain how Data
Privacy is violated in a PIR scheme in order to motivate the construction of our
scheme. In a PIR scheme, only the user's privacy is guarantied. Therefore, the user
sends the database information that is related to its query but is uniformly distributed
over all queries. On the other hand, the database sends the user information that is
directly related to its data which the user uses in order to compute his query. Thus,
this direct information might supply the user with more knowledge than just about
one query.
In our scheme, we avoid sending the user information that is directly related to
the data, yet send him something which he could use to compute his query and this
way prevent the user from gaining more information about the data. In order to do
so, we use additional random auxiliary databases so that D does not give the user
direct information about its data, rather it gives the user information about pointers
to the random database such that the value at the pointer is the same as D's data.
Using the pointers, the user only knows the data of the pointers which he followed and
accessed, and he is able to follow only one pointer by accessing the random database
directly. Therefore, the user only obtains the value of one data bit and privacy for
the database is achieved.
It remains to show how the user accesses the random database directly without
revealing the value of his query to it. This is achieved by introducing two random
databases instead of just one. The database then gives the user a pair of pointers
to locations in the random databases R1 and R2, such that the xor of the values at
those locations is the same as the value at the related index in the original database.
When the user follows the pointer directly this time R1 and R2 can't tell the value of
the user's query because they do not communicate and thus do not know the value
of the other bit of the xor that the user accessed from the other database.
4.1 The Random Pointer Scheme
This scheme consists of a user U with query q, original data of n bits D = bl, ..., bn, k
databases Di for all i E {1,..., k}, and two random databases R1 and R2. R1 and R 2
each consist of a random string with an equal number of zeros and ones. D1,..., Dk
contain the original data, D, and a copy of R1 and R2. The user interacts with the
Dis and the R's and obtains bq. At the end of this protocol, no Di or R knows q, and
U does not know more than bq about D. The Di are not allowed to communicate
with each other and with R1 and R2 after the setup time.
4.1.1 Overview
We give here an informal overview of the scheme, which allows us to achieve Data
Privacy. We start with the last stage of the protocol and go backwards. During the
final stage of the protocol the user asks R1 and R2 for their values at indices j and
1, Ri(j) and R2(1), respectively (where j and 1 are pointers to R's contents that the
user obtained by communicating with the Dis). Using the values of those pointers
the user can compute the value of his query
Ri(j) E R 2 (1) = bq (4.1)
The values of these pointers are chosen by Di's in such a way that a pair of pointers
only gives information about at most one data bit.
The rest of the interaction between the user and D 1,..., Dk serves the purpose
of allowing the user to obtain an appropriate pair of indices (j, 1) that satisfy (5.1),
without revealing any information about his query q. This is done by running a PIR
subprotocol in which D 1,..., Dk use n pairs of the form (jl, 11), (j2, 12 ), ... (jn, n) for
the n pieces of data, and q as the query of the user.
In order for the user to receive the correct value bq in (5.1), the pairs used as data
in the subprotocol must satisfy
Ri(j,i) R 2(r) = br Vr E {1,...,n} (4.2)
These data pairs cannot be chosen deterministically, because (jq, lq) will be sent to
R 1 and R 2 respectively in the clear by the user, so it should not reveal any information
about his interest q. Thus, D1,..., Dk need to share some randomness (in our case,
they share a few random permutations on n bits).
We now turn to describing the scheme formally.
4.1.2 Setup Stage
In this stage the databases get their contents.
* R 1 consists of a random string, chosen uniformly from all strings of n bits, with
equal number of O's and l's.
* R 2 consists of a random string, chosen uniformly from all strings of 2n bits,
with equal number of O's and l's.
* Every Di have the bits bl,..., b,, the contents of R 1, R 2, and three random
permutations 7r,, Ai, r : {1,..., n} --+ {1,... , n}. (The subscripts indicate
whether the permutation will be used to find a location in R 1 or R2 , and the
superscripts indicate the value of the bit that should be found in that location).
We make another assumption here that the D's and R's are honest and do not
agree on any other protocol, or do not give the R's their permutations.
4.1.3 On Line Stage
During the online stage the databases D 1,..., Dk are not allowed to communicate
with each other and with R 1 and R 2 according to the no messages assumptions, and
the R's are not allowed to communicate with each other and with the D's according
to the no communication assumption. The user obtains his desired information bq
through communicating with all of them.
* Each Di computes n pairs (jl,11), (j2,12), ... ,(j, n) from 7rlr, ,7 , {bl ... , b,},
and the content of R 1, R 2, as follows:
- j, = i,(r) for r = 1,... ,n, hence all the j's are chosen completely ran-
domly.
- lr (r = 1, . . ., n) are chosen randomly so that the contents in the j locations
and the I locations will xor to the data bits. To do that, start by letting
b = RI(jr,) b, and m = irb(r). Note that in order to satisfy (5.2) we need
to choose 1, such that R 2(1r) = b. Thus, we let 1, = the index of the m'th
b in R 2. That is, if b = 0 we choose 1, to be the index of the m'th 0 in R 2 ,
and similarly for b = 1. (Note that R2 has 2n bits, consisting of n O's and
n l's. Thus, for any b E {0, 1} and m e {1,..., n}, 1, is well defined).
* D 1,..., Dk and U run the subprotocol PIR with (j, l), (j2, 12), - - (jn, n) as
the data of Di's, and q as the selection index of the User. At the end of the
subprotocol, the User has the pair (j, 1) = (jq, lq).
. The uses sends j to R 1, and I to R2.
* R 1 sends the user the bit RI(j), and R 2 sends the user R2(l).
* The user computes the exclusive-or of these two values, yielding bq = R1 (j) E
R2(l).
Note that we chose 2 random databases R1 and R2. This number of random
databases can be increased in order to allow for the possibility that a coalition of
adversary R can be formed without gaining any information about the user's query.
4.2 Proofs of the RP scheme
Claim 1 (Correctness) If the underlying PIR scheme is correct then the RP
scheme is correct.
Proof: By reduction from the correctness of PIR, after running PIR with all the Di,
the User receives the pair (j, 1) = (jq, lq) corresponding to his selection index q. From
the way 1, was constructed, it is a location in which R2 has the bit b = Ri(j) e bq.
Thus, Ri(j) E R 2 (1) = bq and the user receives the correct value bq.
according to the way (jq, lq) is chosen
Claim 2 (User Privacy) If PIR is user private, then the random pointer scheme
is also user private.
Proof: Since the user communicates with the Di only through PIR, by reduction
from PIR, none of the Di's gets any information about the user's query from their
communication with the user. The extra information the databases have on R1, R2,
7rl, and 7r2 was created before the user asks his query, and they give not information
about the user's query either.
The only communication R 1 gets is the index j = 7r (q) j is a uniformly distributed
index in {1, ... , n}, independent of q. Thus, R 1 cannot get any information about q.
The only communication R 2 gets is the index 1, which is the location of the m'th b-
bit in R 2, where b = Ri(j) ( bq, and m = 7ri(q). Since we showed above j is uniformly
distributed, and since R 1 has half O's and half 1's, it follows that RI(j) Eu {0, 1}, and
therefore b Eu {0, 1}, independent of q. m is uniformly distributed in {1,..., n} by
randomness as above. We showed that b and m are both distributed independent of q,
in fact uniformly, and thus 1 is also uniformly distributed (in {1, ... , 2n}), independent
of q.
4.2.1 Privacy of Database
Theorem 2 (informal statement) For any strategy the user has (possibly cheat-
ing), if all Di and R's follow the protocol, the user cannot get any information about
more than one bit of data bq of his choice.
To state the theorem formally and prove it, we define the view of the user (for any
strategy), and prove that its distribution is independent of all but one bit of data.
Let U be any strategy for the recipient. U runs a PIR subprotocol with the Di's
and the data (jl, 11),... ,(ji, I,), at the end of which he receives (jq, ,l) and possibly
additional information about these data bits which the subprotocol leaks. We assume
a worst case in which U receives the full information about all the data bits, namely
he gets (jl, 11), (j2,12), ... , (jn, n), and we show that even in this worst case, U cannot
obtain any information about the real bits bl,..., b, other than a single bit bq of his
choice.
Let V(j, 1) = [(jl, 11),..., (j,, 1), Ri(j), R2(1)], V(j, 1) is the view received by a U
sends queries j, I to R 1, R 2 respectively. (This is the assumption mentioned above.
In reality, the view of U can be derived from V(j, 1), but is possibly much smaller).
Note that an honest U should set j = jq, 1 = lq, but we allow a possibly cheating U,
who may choose arbitrary j, 1.
Consider a partial view V- = [(jl, l1),...,(jn, In), Rl(j)] where the last answer
(from R 2 ) is omitted. Let M be the domain of all possible partial views V-. Thus,
IMI = 2n!(2n). We will prove that the partial view V- is uniformly distributed over
M, and from this we will be able to prove that the distribution of the complete view
V depends only on one bit of data.
In what follows, the notation X , U[M] means that the random variable X is
distributed uniformly over the domain M.
Theorem 1 Vj, 1, the distribution of V(j, 1) may depend on at most one bit of data.
More specifically, for any possible view V(jr, ,1,) E M X {0, 1},
C if Rl(j,) E R2(I,) = br,
Prob[V(jr, lr,)]
1- otherwiseIMI
where c = 1 if r = r', and E = 1 - 2 if r : r', and probabilities are taken over
the choices of 7•1 ,, 7i, R1, R 2.
Note that from this theorem, if j, 1 correspond to a pair (jr, l,) (as in the honest
user case), then the view provides complete information about br (since e = 1, so
br = Rl(jr) E R 2 ( lr)), whereas if j, I do not correspond to such a pair, only partial
information about br, is provided (since there is a positive probability for both brl = 0
and bl, = 1).
In either case, the last two components of the view contain information about the
bit br, but the view does not depend on any other bit.
We proceed with a sequence of lemmas that will prove the theorem, by gradually
adding components to the view, while maintaining its independence of all data bits
except blr. The first three lemmas will establish the uniform distribution of the V-,
and lemma 4 will complete the calculation for the last component in the view.
Lemma 1 Vj, Ri(j) -, U[{0, 1}] (probability is taken over choice of Ri).
Proof: Obvious, since R 1 is chosen uniformly from all strings of length n with half
O's and half l's, and thus for any particular location j, R, (j) is 0 or 1 with equal
probability. C
Lemma 2 Vj, [ji, ... jn I Ri(j)] - U[all permutations on {1,..., n}] (probability
is taken over choice of ?rl).
Proof: 7rl is a uniformly distributed permutation
This is true independent of R 1(j), and thus [j1,..., jI I Ri(j)] = [jl,..., j,] is also
uniformly distributed. C
Lemma 3 Vj, [i, . . . , I, R,(j), j, ... , jn] , U over all sequences of n distinct loca-
tions in {1,..., 2n} (probability is taken over choices of R1, R 2 , 7 r, ).
Proof: Given values R, (j), ji,..., j,, we want to prove that every sequence 11,..., 1,
is equally likely (i.e. uniform distribution). Fix an arbitrary R, with a suitable Ri(j).
This defines a sequence of bits {t, = Ri(r) ( br}=,. Then, for r E {1,...,n}, 1, is
chosen to be the index of the m,'th bit with value t, in R 2 , where Mr = 2rt (r). Thus,
for any particular sequence 11,..., 1,, Prob[ll,..., , I R 1, Ri(j), ji,..., j,] = Prob[Vr :
R 2 (r) = tr A 7r' (r) = mr if I, is the mr'th bit with value t, in R 2]. This probability
(for a fixed R1) is taken over R2 and 7r2, 7rl. It is not necessary to calculate the exact
probability to see that it is the same for each sequence 11,... In, since r and 7r' are
both uniformly distributed permutations. We have some number k of restrictions on
the values of Ar and n - k restrictions on the values of 7r', which yields a certain
probability that these restrictions will be satisfied, regardless of the actual values
11,..., 1,n of the restrictions'. Thus for each sequence we have the same probability,
and thus [l,... , In I R 1, R,(j), jl,..., ij] ~ U over all sequences of n distinct locations
in {1,..., 2n}. (where probability is taken over the choice of R2 , lr° , r21). This is true
for any fixed R1, and thus it is also true when R, is chosen randomly. O
Lemma 4 Vj = jr, I = Ir,
Prob[R2 (r) = 0 R,(jr), ji, .... In, 11. . .I i] = if br, = R, [rl1 - E if bri = R, [jr]
IFor a direct calculation, it is not hard to check that the probability is
() (n- k)! k! 1 1(2n) n! n! (2n)! (2n)(2n - 1)...(2n - n)
which is exactly the probability of uniformly selecting a sequence of n distinct locations in
{1,...,2n}, as needed.
2(n-1) if r - r'and b,, = Ri[jr]
2 + 2(n-1) if r Z r'and br, = R [jr]
1 if r = r'and br, = R [j,]
0 if r = r'and br, = RI[jr]
where E = 1 if r = r' , and e = 2 - 1 if r : r'. (probability is taken over choices
of R 1)
Proof: Given Ri(jr), ji,..., j,, 11,..., I,, from the way the lr's were chosen, R 2(lr) =
Rl(ji,) e br,, and thus R 2(lr') = 0 4== Rl(jr,) = br. Therefore,
Prob[R2(r,) = 0 R1 (jr), ji,..., j,, li,..., l,] =
= Prob[Ri(jr() = bri I Ri(jr),ji, ... ,n, li,... ,ln]= Prob[Ri(jr) = bri Ri(jr)](n-2) if r r'and br Rj
_ - if r - r'and b,o = Ri[j,]
1 if r = r'and br, = Ri[jr]
0 if r = r'and br, = Ri[j]r
For r = r' this is obvious. For r : r' this is true because R1 is a random string of
length n with 2 O's and 1 l's. Given R [jrl], there are ( 1) possible strings for R1,
each equally probable. Out of those, the number of possibilities where R [jr'] = br, is
(,2), if br, = Rl[jr], and (,1j) otherwise.
n-2 1 1 2and 1 1 which
Now it is easy to verify that = 2 2(-1 + 1 which
completes the proof of the lemma. O
Proof of Theorem 2: Vj = jr, = lr, VV = [(j, ll), ... , (jn, in), Ri(jr)], VV =
[v-, R 2(lr')],
Prob(v-) = Prob[Ri(jr)] -Prob[jl,... j, I Rl(jr)].
-Prob[ll,..., In I Ri(jr),ji,..., j,] =
Since by lemmas 1,2,3 all three terms in the product are uniformly distributed over
their domain of possible values, and therefore V- is uniformly distributed over its
domain M. Now, from lemma 4 we have that
Prob[v v-] = 6
1-c
if R[j,] ® R2 [lr,] = b,,
otherwise
Combining these equations, we get
Prob[v] = Prob[v-] - Prob[v I v-] = 1-M
1--E
if Ri(jr) q R 2(lr) = blr
otherwise
which completes the proof of the theorem. O
Claim 3 (Communication Complexity)
The communication Complexity is O(log(n)PIR(n, k)) where PIR(n, k) is a private
information scheme with k database of n bits.
The communication complexity of this scheme is O(log(n)) to communicate with
R1 and R2. The complexity for communicating with the rest of the databases is
the same as PIR done for log(n) bits, O(log(n)CCPIR(n, k)). Thus the over all
communication complexity is O(log(n)CCPIR(n, k)).
Chapter 5
Randomized Approach for Secure
Data Distribution
In the previous chapter we showed how to achieve Database Privacy. However, that
scheme does not solve DRP. In this section we present a scheme which solves the Data
Replication Problem by achieving Private Data Distribution security. By private-
data-distribution security we mean that any t + 1 auxiliary databases contain infor-
mation that is t-wise independent from the original database and can be prepared
ahead of time. We assume that there are no more than t faulty databases. Therefore,
the auxiliary databases cannot construct the original data from their data and the
problem is solved. In addition we describe how to combine it with the RP scheme
of the previous section in order to achieve a scheme which guaranties Private Data
Distribution, Data Privacy, and User Privacy. The results are achieved by a reduction
on a PIR scheme with only a constant factor t > 2 increase in the communication
complexity.
We achieve this by replacing "real" copies of the database D by t random databases
(R's). These R's are constructed such that any set of up to t R's is independent of the
actual data (and thus no information about the data can be extracted from it), but
still all R's together can simulate real copies of the original database when interacting
with users who wish to retrieve information.
5.1 The Random DB Scheme
This scheme consists of a user U with query q E {1, ..., n}, and t * k + 1 Databases:
the original database D of n bits D = bl,..., b,, and t * k auxiliary databases RR4, for
all i E {1, ..., t} and j E {1,..., k} for constant t > 2 k > 1. During the setup stage, D
computes all the R's and distributed them. Then, during the runtime stage, the user
interacts with D and Rjis in order to obtain bq. At the end of this protocol, neither
D nor the Ri~s know q, and no coalition of RP,j'a of size < t has any information
about D. The Ris for different j's are not allowed to communicate with each other
or with D after the setup time, no coalition of t Rj,'s with the same j but different
i's is allowed to communicate.
5.1.1 The Setup Stage:
The original database D prepares k * t random databases denotes by:
R 1,1  R 2,1 ... Rt,
Rl,k R2,k ... Rt,k
Such that:
* The databases R1,i, ..., R(t-1),i for all i E {1, ..., k} are chosen uniformly from all
possible databases of size n.
* The databases Rt,i for all i E {1, ..., k} are computed by xoring D with all
the random Rj,i for all j E {1, ..., t}. In other words, Rt,i is chosen such that
R,i •E ... @ Rt,i = D.
Note that for each row, i E {1, ..., t} all but one of the R's can be prepared in
advance. We suggest that D does not have to prepare them at setup time, rather D
can access a special web server designed for this purpose and choose ready R's for
this protocol.
5.1.2 Assumptions:
We assume that no t databases of the same row, RI,j, ...R(t-1),j communicate with
one another.
5.1.3 Proofs of Setup Stage
Claim 4 (Communication Complexity) The communication complexity of the
setup stage of the RDB scheme is O(ktn) which is a constant factor t larger than the
setup communication complexity of the PIR scheme (when the databases is copied to
k auxiliary databases).
Claim 5 (Private Data Distribution) The view of a coalition of size < t) R's is
uniformly distributed over all D 's, and thus gives no information about D and thus
achieves Private Data Distribution security.
Proof: Any coalition of (t - 1)R from the same row is uniformly distributed over D.
Fix some t - 1R's we compute their xor. Given this xor for any D there is a possible
Rt which matches it to the xor, since all the R's are chosen randomly from a uniform
distribution, R E D is also uniformly distributed over all R, we gain no information
about D because each D is still equally likely. This is true for any subset of t - 1 R's.
5.1.4 On Line
During the runtime stage the user interacts with D and Ri,js in order to obtain bq.
At the end of this protocol, neither D nor the Ri,js know q, and no coalition of Ri,j'a
of size < t has any information about D. The Rijs for different j's are not allowed to
communicate with each other or with D after the setup time, no coalition of tRi,j's
with the same j but different i's is allowed to communicate.
User U with query q E {1... n} and the databases execute a protocol using any
Private Information retrieval PIR scheme with the restriction that PIR(((D G R) E
R), D, q) = PIR(D E R, D, q) e PIR(R, D, q) our example is [14], :
* U prepares random subsets of indices S1,..., Sk as in [14].
* U sends Si -+ Rl,i,..., Rt,i for each i E {1,..., k}
* Each database Rj,i for i E {1, ..., k} and j E {1, ..., t}, upon receiving Si sends
the user eindESi Rind Where Rind is the value R has in the ind index.
* U XORs the values he has received from all of the databases and produces bq,,
the qth value.
5.1.5 Proofs of the Online Stage
Claim 6 (correctness) The value obtained when using the RDB scheme with an
intended query q and the underlying PIR scheme is bq.
Proof: From our construction, Vi Rl,i e ... E RP,i = D, the xor of any database row
is D. Therefore, after asking each of these databases the same query and xoring the
answers, the user gets the answer he would get from D to the same query (since the
kinds of queries used involve xoring of subsets and other operations which are closed
under xor).
This is true for every row i, and thus the value obtained by combining the an-
swers of the rows is the same value obtained by combining the answers of the copies
D 1,... , Dk in the [14] scheme. O
Claim 7 (User Privacy) The messages the user sends in the RDB scheme with
a PIR underlying scheme satisfies User Privacy, i.e. are independent of the user's
query.
Proof: Since the messages the user sends to D and each Rij are the same as the
messages that he would send using PIR, his messages are independent of his query
by reduction. The R's and D's do not communicate with one another and hence
cannot find out the query. The only databases that can communicate are the ones
from one row, but they all receive the same message so they get no information by
communicating. O
Claim 8 (Communication Complexity) The communication complexity of the
Online stage of the RDB scheme is O(t * CCPIR(n, k)) where CCPIR(n, k) is the
communication complexity of a PIR scheme with k databases of size n.
Proof: The communication complexity of the RDB scheme is exactly the same as
in the PIR scheme, except that for each database in the underlying scheme we have
a row of t databases here. Thus, the communication complexity is O(t * CCPIR(n)).
Assumptions
The Ri,js for different j's are not allowed to communicate with each other or with D,
after the setup time. In addition, no coalition of t Ri,j's with the same j but different
i's are allowed to communicate at all times.
5.2 Combining RP and RDB
In the above description of the RP scheme we treated Di as if it was a database
in a PIR scheme, instead in order to satisfy the properties of RDB we treat it as
a database in the RDB scheme. In other words, in the RP scheme every Di for
i E {1, ..., k} we replace by R and Di @ R (for the simple case of t = 2). The user
sends to R and Di @ R what he would have sent to Di using a PIR scheme. When,
the user gets the xors of the locations he first finds the location given to him by R,
by xoring the results from all the R's. Similarly the user gets the locations given to
him by Di E R. The user asks R1 and R2 for the values at the locations given to
him by R and by Di E R and then xors the results to obtain Xq. Note that the main
idea here is that when the RDB scheme used the [14] it did not matter which xor
it performed first. Here it is important to first ask R1 and R2 for the values in the
locations and then xor the values, and not xor the locations and ask R1 and R2 in a
xored location.
Chapter 6
Oblivious Database Scheme for No
Data Distribution
In this section we present a scheme which solves Database Privacy and the Data Repli-
cation Problem by achieving no-data-distribution security. By no-data-distribution
security we mean that all auxiliary databases contain information that is completely
independent from the original database and can be prepared ahead of time. There-
fore, the original data is not distributed to the auxiliary database and the problem is
solved.
Before we go on to describe the scheme let us offer some motivation as to why
we prefer no-data-distribution to the private-data-distribution level of security which
we achieved in the previous chapter. Or in other words why completely independent
databases are more desirable than pairwise independent databases. There are two
immediate reasons for this. First, we would like the auxiliary database's data to be
such that it will not give any information about the database even if the auxiliary
databases break the rules and communicate among themselves. Otherwise, the data
would enable them to regroup and form a new database which they could sell without
the help of the original database. Second, we would like the auxiliary databases to be
prepared ahead of time so that they will not have to compute their random contents
immediately upon the request of the database, rather they can prepare it at a more
convenient time, and also use it for other applications.
6.1 Overview of the Scheme
This scheme involves a user, a database, and 2 random and independent auxiliary
databases. As before, the user interacts with all those databases in order to obtain his
query, while all the databases are not allowed to communicate with one another. This
type of interaction, however, is not immediate in our current scenario because if the
auxiliary databases are completely independent then how can the user obtain relevant
information from them. This difficulty is solved by assigning the auxiliary databases
a new and different purpose or function than the one they had in the previous scheme.
Their new purpose is to function as encryptors and permutors that are used to create
an oblivious database from the original database. By an oblivious database we mean
an n bit uniformly distributed string to which the database cannot find a mapping
from the bits of the original data with probability greater than chance. The random
auxiliary databases are used in two different settings. At setup time they encrypt and
permute the original database to create an oblivious database as we mentioned. At
runtime they provide the user with the decryption keys to his query to the oblivious
database.
Instead of dividing the computation in our scheme into two stages, we could have
used any multi party computation scheme. However, the communication complexity
of multi party computation schemes is too large for our purposes (more than sublinear)
and it involves many rounds of computation. By dividing our scheme into two stages,
we are able to reduce the communication complexity of the runtime stage in which
a multi party computation is not performed. On the other hand, the setup stage, in
which a multi party computation is performed is executed only at the beginning of
many queries, and we consider it no more expensive than the stage in the previous
schemes in which the databases are duplicated. The runtime stage is the one that
is executed as much time as there are queries. Therefore, the overall communication
complexity is sublinear.
At the setup stage the oblivious database is created via a multi party computation
scheme between the original database and the two random auxiliary databases. Dur-
ing the computation the Database is encrypted by one of the auxiliary database and
permuted according to the contents of the other auxiliary database. The result of the
multi party computation goes to the original database. Following this computation,
the user, at run time, is able to privately query the oblivious database by accessing
it directly. The direct access is private because the data is oblivious to the original
database and thus he cannot find the original query from the index that was accessed.
The user knows the new permuted location of his query through communicating with
the auxiliary database, and similarly he knows how to decrypt his value based on
the communication with the other auxiliary database. The communication with the
auxiliary database is done through a PIR scheme so the user's query is again secure.
Before we give the detailed description of the multi party computation scheme,
let us summerize what this scheme achieves. No data distribution privacy for the
database is achieved because the auxiliary databases are random and prepared ahead
of time. In addition, the user's privacy is achieved because the user's direct accesses is
distributed uniformly for all the queries since the oblivious database does not give any
information about its real query. The user's interaction with the auxiliary databases
is also private because it is done through a PIR scheme. Furthermore, data privacy
is achieved because the user receives the encryption of only one value, his query,
and no other. The communication complexity of this scheme is a factor of log(n)
times the communication complexity of the Private Information Retrieval scheme.
The scheme achieves information theoretic security that depends on the assumptions
we make about the faultiness of the databases. In this scheme we assume that the
databases are honest in addition we assume that they follow the No Communication
assumptions meaning that they do not communicate with one another via any form
of communication.
6.2 Setup Stage: Creating the Oblivious Database
We will now describe the multi party computation which occurs during the setup
stage and creates the oblivious database using the auxiliary databases. Later we will
describe the runtime stage.
During the setup stage the original database, D, performs a multi party compu-
tation with the auxiliary databases, R and P. The result of this computation goes
to the database and it is an oblivious version of it which is uniformly distributed in
{0, 1}" over all choices of P and R.
The oblivious database is created through a xor of the original database with R
and then permuting the result with a random permutation which is the value of P.
More formally:
* Database D contains the bits bl,..., b,
* R contains a random sequence of n bits: {xz,..., x,} which we denote by R.
* P contains a permutation P of the indices of D, (jl,... ,in).
* D, R, P perform a Multi Party computation described below to compute the
encryption of D which is a xor with R and permutation using P. E(D) =
P(R @ D) and is held by D at the end of the computation.
The multi party computation is done as follows:
D prepares a random database D1 and computes D2 such that D = D1 E D2.
R prepares random R1 and computes R2 such that R = R1 D R2.
P prepares a random permutation P1, and computes P2 such that P(D) = P2(Pl(D)).
Note that even though we ask the parties to prepare their values for the computation
now, those values are independent of one another and can also be prepared ahead of
time, i.e. R can also prepare R1 and R2 ahead of time. The following information is
sent between the parties in secure channels:
* D - R: D1
* D -- P: D2
SP--R: P1
* R--P:R2
* P-+D:P2
* P -+ D: P(R2ED 02)
D computes P2([P1(R1 e Di)]) e [P(R2 D 02)] which we will show to be P(R e D),
where the contents of [] he received. D now has P(R e D)
P and R discard all the values that were sent to them during the multi party
computation. (they discard D1 D2 R2 and P1)
After the computation
* D has E(D)
* P and R do not know D.
* E(D) is uniformly distributed over all choices of P and R.
The communication complexity of the setup stage is high - but so it is in the
PIR case when the databases are duplicated they need to send the whole data to the
auxiliary database.
6.2.1 Assumptions:
For the multi party part of the protocol we assume that the databases are Honest
But Curious: they follow the protocol meaning that they do not exchange some other
information such as an agreement of how to act later in order to get the user's query.
In addition the databases follow the no-messages assumption meaning that they do
not send each other extra messages outside of what the protocol permits.
After the MPC P and R do not need the information that was sent to them
during the computation. Therefore since they follow the protocol they can discurd
this information right afterwards. One thing to notice here is that during the multi
party computation R and P gain information that is not completely independent of
D. If P and R would get together they could obtain all of D's secrets from D1 and
D2. We still consider this scheme to achieve no-data-distribution security because P
* R -+ D: PI(R1 $ D1)
and R do not need to keep this knowledge in order to function as a database. So we
assume that they discard those bits before they have a chance to become malicious.
The assumption that the auxiliary databases indeed discurd the information which
they do not need requires honest databases. In order to relax this assumption we can
allow only less than t > 2 faulty auxiliary databases. Therefore, if we increase the
number of auxiliary databases, such that instead of having just two R and P, we
can have R1, R2, ...Rt/2, P1, P2, ...Pt/2 databases, then D can construct D1, ...Dt
instead of D1 and D2 for the multi party computation, and only a coalition of t
databases will be able to compute D from it. But we are only allowing less than t
faulty databases.
6.3 Proofs of the Setup Stage
Claim 9 (Correctness) D has P(ReD) at the end of the multi party computation.
Proof: D computes P2([Pl(R1 e Dl)]) @ [P(R2 e D2)]. Let X = (R1 ÷ D1) and
Y = (R2 @ D2) This comes down to showing that P(X) $ P(Y) = P(X E Y) In the
left side of the equation we first permute all the bits and then xor them. In the right
side of the equation we first xor the bits and then permute the bits. Thus, both sides
are equal. We also note trivially that R @ D = (R1 4 D1) @ (R2 @ D2).
Claim 10 (Security) We define the view of R to be R.V. At the end of the multi
party computation R.V is independent of D.
Proof: R.V = D1UP1 which are random sequences of bits and are chosen randomly
from all sequences {0, 1 } independently of D.
Claim 11 (Security) We define the view of R to be R.V. At the end of the multi
party computation R.V is independent of P.
Proof: R.V = P1UD1 which are chosen randomly from all sequences {0, 1}) inde-
pendently of P.
Claim 12 (Security) We define the view of P as P.V. At the end of the multi
party computation P.V is independent of D and R.
Proof: P.V = R2, D2. R2 and D2 are uniformly distributed in all sequences {0, 1}n
taken over all choices of R and D since they are the result of a xor of a bit string with
a random bit string. Therefore, the probability that P communicates with a certain
R and D is equal for all R and D's so P gets no information about them and its view
is independent of R and D
Claim 13 (Obliviousnes of E(D)) At the end of the multi party computation D's
view is an oblivious database: E (given D) is uniformly distributed over all sequences
{0, 1}". Taken over all possible R and P.
Proof: D is fixed. For every possible P we can find an R that will encrypt D to
become E. Since P and R are unformly distributed and they are chosen randomly
from those choices. Each pair of P's and R's are equally likely and therefore all E's
are equally likely and are of the same distribution.
The view of D is actually Pl(R1eD1), P2, P(R2ED2). D can compute P(R(D)),
and using P2, D can find P1(R2@D2), P1(R(D)), and he has P1(R1D1). Suppose
that D tries all possible permutations P1. For each possible permutation P1, D can
compute a properly fitting R, R1, R2 such that R = R1 e R2, by first permuting
E(D) with the inverse of P1 and then xoring the result with D. Since P, R and R1
are chosen randomly and independently , all those possibilities are of equally likely.
Therefore, D is not able to get anything new about P1 and therefore P. Similarly,
D does not learn anything new about R.
Claim 14 (Communication Complexity) The communication complexity of the
setups stage is scheme is 5n + 2n log(n) for all the messages sent in the multi party
computation.
6.4 On Line - The User's Query
Having described how E, the oblivious database, is created, we will describe how it
is used during runtime in order to achieve privacy for the user and privacy for the
database.
The on line phase involves a user U with query q E {1,..., n}. A database D
which holds the original data and the resulting oblivious database, E. In addition,
there are two auxiliary database R and P as during the setup stage.
When the user wishes to get the value of his query q, from the database D, he first
queries P using a PIR (Private Information Retrieval) scheme for the q'th index and
gets the permuted location or the corresponding location in E, jq. The user queries
R for the decryption of the value of q, using the PIR scheme. Then, the user goes to
D and asks directly for the value at jq. He then receives an encryption of his desired
value and decrypts it using the values he received from R.
More Formally: By A PIR B we mean interaction between A and B trough the
PIR protocol, and similarly DIRECT means interacting directly in the clear.
* U PIR P: q, and p PIR U:jq.
* U PIR R: q, and R PIR U:xq.
* U Direct D: jq*
* D Diret U: E(D)jq
* U decrypts by computing E(D)jq, xq in order to obtain bq.
6.4.1 Assumptions:
We assume that the databases are honest bur curious and that they follow the protocol
and do not send the user some other information then what they are supposed to.
The databases also follow the No-Communication assumption which means that they
are not allowed to communicate in any form, they are not allowed to send extra
messages and they are not allowed to act as a user for example, and interact with
another database in that way.
6.5 Proofs of the Online
Claim 15 (User Privacy) The oblivious database scheme is User Private: Given
D and E, the user's query jq is uniformly distributed for all indices i in D.
Proof: Pr•" is the permuted location of i for some i] =
All possible permutations such that j-+i given D&E
All possible permutations given D&E
Since E is uniformly distributed over all P and R which we proven in the setup stage
proofs.
All permutations s.t.j-i
All possible permutations
Because all P's are chosen randomly with the same probability from the same distri-
bution, the number of all possible permutations with one bit fixed (j --+ i) is (n - 1)!.
Therefore, the probability is:
n! - n
Therefore the probability that j is related to a particular i is the same as the
probability of guessing any i. Thus one j is not related to a particular i with any
more probability than chance. So the database cannot match the user's question jq
with the query q with probability greater than chance.
Claim 16 (User Privacy) The query the user sends P and R is uniformly dirsributed.
Proof: The user uses PIR directly to talk to P and R so therefore based on PIR
schemes P and R receives information that is uniformly distributed over all queries.
Claim 17 (Data Privacy) The oblivious database scheme satisfies Database Pri-
vacy.
Proof: D does not give extra information to the user, since the user only gets one
encrypted bit, the one of his query.
Claim 18 (No-Data-Distribution) The oblivious database scheme satisfies No
Data Distribution.
Proof: As shown in the setup time proofs, R and P do not have any information
about D, and their data was prepared ahead of time and is completely independent
of D.
Claim 19 (Correctness) If PIR is correct then this scheme gives the user the
correct value bq.
Proof: Based on the correctness of the underlying PIR scheme the user gets the
correct new location of the index q from P, and the correct xq from R. Therefore, he
is able to get the correct value from the correct location and decrypt it properly.
Claim 20 (Communication Complexity) The communication complexity is O(log(n)*
CCPIR(k, n)). Where CCPIR is the communication complexity of a PIR scheme
with k databases of n bits.
Proof: We analyze the communication complexity here, in terms of the communica-
tion complexity of the PIR [14] scheme, denoted by CCPIR(n, k). The communi-
cation complexity is log(n) to retrieve the encrypted bit, because the user sends an
index to D of size log(n). The communication complexity is O(log(n) *CCPIR(k, n))
to get the permuted location of q because it is log(n) bits to represent the in-
dex to n and we do PIR for all those bits. The communication complexity is
CCPIR(k, n) to get the random bit from R. Over all the communication complexity
is O(log(n)CCPIR(k, n))
6.6 Extensions
So far the results achieving No data distribution guarantee privacy for the user for
a single application of the scheme. However, when this scheme is used repeatedly,
the database is able to tell whether the user is asking for the same query. This
compromises the security of the user. We have not fully examined a way in which
this problem is solved, but we do suggest a scheme which can be used in future
examination.
First let us examine the following trivial solution: after each query set R and P to
be new random values and rerun the setup stage. Obviously this is too costly for the
database. Therefore, we would like to run the scheme consecutively with the same
setup stage. Another trivial solution is for the user to scan the whole database. This
way the Database does not know which query the user actually wanted. But this is
not efficient either.
In order to achieve a secure yet feasible solution we propose to use a method that
is a compromise between the two trivial methods. This solutions is inspired by the
Oblivious RAM [17] scheme. In this solution, the user does not have to scan the whole
database, instead he scans a smaller section (we propose the size n1/3 ) which we call
the shelter. Only when the shelter is full, after some queries (n1/3), we reinitialize the
setup stage, and not after every query as suggested in the trivial solution.
The scheme works by adding two parts to the oblivious database, a shelter and
a dummy section. The shelter is a separate part of memory to which the user can
write, and it holds the values of indices that were already queried along with their
permuted address. The dummy section consists of garbage values and its contents
are interwined with those of the oblivious database such that the dummy section
is indistinguishable from the other parts of the oblivious database. When the user
queries the Database he first scans the shelter. If his query is in the shelter then he
obtains it and accesses a dummy location. If his query is not in the shelter he accesses
the permuted location of his query. Since the locations of the dummy section and
the real section are indistinguishable, the Database cannot tell those two cases apart
and therefore cannot tell whether the user is accessing something for the second time.
Whichever value the user accessed (real or dummy) he then places its content along
with its address in the shelter. This way the user never accesses the same location
twice because if something was already accessed then it is in the shelter.
This gives us a method to hide the user's access pattern for multiple queries.
Since the whole shelter is scanned at each query. The communication complexity is
increased according to the size of the shelter. Therefore, the size of the shelter should
be as small as possible. On the other hand we can only have number of accesses as
the size of the shelter before we need to reinitialize the setup stage. We would like
the number of repeated steps to be as large as possible. In our case we can fix the size
of the shelter to be n1/ 3 which is the same as the PIR communication complexity so
it would only add a constant factor in our over all communication complexity and it
is a pretty large number for repeated queries without reinitialization.
We will now describe the details of how the scheme works for a shelter of size k:
Before the multi party computation:
* R adds k random bits to its data so that now it has x1, ..., ,+k
* P is a new random permutation of n + k locations.
The Multi Party Computation is performed as before.
* D receives an oblivious database of size n + k.
* D adds a size k empty shelter to its data. This shelter is write accessible to the
user.
At runtime the user has the query q which is his m'th query to the database
since the setup stage.
* The user uses PIR to get q's decryption key Xq from R as before.
* The user uses PIR to get q's new location from P, j,, as before.
* The user scans the shelter to check whether j, was already accessed. (In the
shelter the encrypted bits are tagged with their permuted location.)
* If the user finds the tag j, then he decrypts it using Xq and has his query.
- Now the user needs to access something in the oblivious database so that
the database will not know that the user is accessing the same thing again.
- The user ask P using PIR for the m'th dummy location, n + m and gets
jn+m back.
- The user directly sends jm+n to E. and receives the garbage value Xm+n.
- The user places Xm+n and a tag jm+n in the shelter.
* If the user does not find the tag jq in the shelter:
- The user asks P using PIR for the location at q, and gets jq again. (This
is done because the user needs to ask P again so that P will not know that
the user found his query in the shelter).
- The user sends directly to E jq and receives Ej3 .
- The user places Ej, in the shelter along with the tag j,.
Then for everybody:
* The user decrypts the value he obtained using xq and gets the value of his query
bq.
* P updates its public counter of how many times it has been accessed since the
setup time. So that the user will have the value of m next time.
Since the user talks to P using PIR, P cannot know whether the user is asking
for the address of a dummy location or of q again.
The user does not gain any information by looking at all the shelter because it
cannot map the tags of the shelter to the real database bits.
6.7 Draw Back of the Oblivious Database Scheme
We wish to point out a disadvantage of this scheme. The database cannot communi-
cate with the random databases R and P at all, not even as a user. In the previous
schemes if the database queried the supplementary databases as a user he could not
get information about user's queries. However, in this scheme if it queried R or P as
a user it would be able to get information about what the decryption keys are, and
therefore information about the user's queries. Although, this scheme has this disad-
vantage we feel that using it for no data distribution security constitutes a worthwhile
tradeoff since we assume that the database is trustworthy and that it will not com-
municate with forbidden parties as long as those parties do not hold information that
is dependent on its own.
Chapter 7
Similarity To Oblivious Transfer
Database Privacy and User Privacy togetehr, as achieved in our schemes are identical
to the (') oblivious transferproblem, since we defined security to mean the privacy of
the user's query and the privacy of the database's information.
In (;) oblivious transferthere are two parties Alice and Bob. Alice has a n secrets
Si, ... , S, and Bob has an index i E {1, ..., n}. At the end of the protocol, Bob gets
Si, and no information about any Sj for j : i, and Alice does not know i. In the
secure information retrieval problem the database is Alice and the user is Bob.
Previously, the Oblivious Transfer problem was only studies in a model with one
Alice. In the one Alice model it was shown that the protocols communication com-
plexity cannot be smaller then linear in n.
In this paper, the (n) oblivious transferproblem was studies in a multiple Alice
model. In this model, we have shown that the communication complexity can be
reduced to size sublinear in n. This is a major improvement because up until now
the communication complexity of (n) oblivious transferwas thought to be linear. In
addition, we achieve information theoretic security which is unattainable in the one
Alice model.
Chapter 8
Hiding User's ID
8.1 Introduction
So far we showed how to achieve Database Privacy, Private Data Distribution, and
User Privacy. This prevents the database from knowing which query the user is
interested in. However, it allows the database to gain information about the user
nontheless, because the database knows that the user is interested in one of its bits.
This is important information in cases where the access to the database itself is
controversial, and not so much which bit is accessed, as is the case of databases of job
listings. Sometimes the user wishes to conceal the fact that he is looking for a new
job but he does care to hide exactly which job he is looking for. Therefore, in this
chapter we deal with preventing the database from knowing whether a certain user
accessed it or not. We call this problem the Secure Identity problem not because we
are hiding the user's identity but because we prevent information from being linked
to the user's identity that might be used against him.
Not much work has been done in order to solve this problem. There is, how-
ever, a sight in Carnegie Mellon University called anonymizer which allows one
to "surf the web without revealing any personal information". It is currently re-
stricted to Carnegie Mellon Computer Science sites. The URL for this page is
Http://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu:8080/ maintained by Justin Boyan (jab@cs.cmu.edu).
Still, the privacy of the user on this site is conditional on the fact that the user trusts
this particular anonymizer server since this server itself can obtain information about
the user when the user surfs through it.
In order to solve the Secure ID problem, we consider a network model which must
include more than one database or one user, otherwise since the information is sent
and retrieved, it will be clear to the database that a retrieval is occurring between it
and the sole user. Such a network can be modeled using multiple users or multiple
databases. In this thesis, we choose to use the multiple databases approach by in-
cluding in the network databases with different real data (as opposed to duplicates
or random auxiliary ones that are needed for the other scheme). This prevents a
database from knowing whether the user is accessing its contents or the contents of
another database in the network. For example the network would consist of the fol-
lowing databases: a job listing, stocks information, movies in Cambridge, a university
technical report listing. Using such a network the job listing database would not know
whether the user is interested in its data or in any other data in this network and
thus will not give the database information that is meaningful about the user.
One trivial solution to the secure ID problem is to have the user query all the
databases in the network. This way each database does not know whether the user
was interested in its bits or not. We assume that each database is queried using
PIR so that the user's query to the database will not be revealed. The commu-
nication complexity of this result is O(n * CCPIR(m)), where CCPIR(m) is the
the communication complexity to query one database of length m using PIR. This
communication complexity is too large.
Our solution achieves communication complexity of O(log(n)CCPIR(n)+log(m)CCPIR(m)
by introducing another party S which is a server who helps with the protocol. Thus
our model now consists of a user, a server, and n different databases of length m.
Each database also has a pair of R and P with which it creates an oblivious version
of it using the oblivious database scheme described in chapter 6. However, here, in-
stead of sending the oblivious database to the original database as in chapter 6, the
oblivious database is sent directly to the server S. Then the server according to a
random permutation sends it to another database in the network. The databases do
not know, and cannot determine, whose oblivious database they received. The user
queries the database as in the oblivious database scheme of chapter 6, which means
that he directly accesses the oblivious database. In order to find the new address of
the oblivious database the user queries the server S using a PIR scheme. The user
asks his query from the oblivious database in its new location in the network. Thus,
the communication complexity of this scheme is O(log(n)CCPIR(n)) for querying
the oblivious database and O(log(m)CCPIR(m)) for querying S.
8.2 Scheme
This scheme consists of n different original databases of length m, 2n databases of
random bits, 2n permutation databases, a server S, and a user. Each group of 1
original database 2 random databases and 2 permutations are assigned a location by
the server.
8.2.1 At Setup Time:
There are n databases. Each database Di has a location i in the network. The server
S contains a random permutation, NEW - LOC, that maps location i E {1, ..., n}
of each database Di to some random location 1 in the network. The permutation is
represented in S in a way that the ith index in S's database contains the location 1.
Each database Di performs a multi party computation as described in chapter 6
with the random R and P of his group. Except that now the result of the multi party
computation go to S instead of to Di. So that S receives [Pli(Rli e Dli)], P2i,
[Pi(R2i @ D2i)], and computes P2i([Pli(Rli @ Dli)]) @ [Pi(R2i E D2i)], in order
to receive E(Di) = Pi(Ri D Di). Once S has E(Di) for each i E {1, ..., n} it sends
E(Di) to the location 1 in the network, 1 = NEW - LOC(i).
At the end of this, each database in the network holds an oblivious version of
another randomly chosen database in the network whose identity it cannot determine
without communicating with the server S.
So at the end of the setup stage the network consists of databases Di which
hold their original value Di, and an encrypted database E(Dj), such that NEW -
LOC(j) = i, and S contains the value i in its j'th index.
Then S also relocates the R's and P's according to the same permutation.
8.2.2 At Run Time:
When the user wishes to ask his query q, from a database Di, he first queries S to
find NEW - LOC(i) = 1. Then, he goes to the lth place in the storage of P's and
asks Pi's for the q'th index and gets jq back. The user then asks the Ri in the lth
location for the value of q, and receives Xq. Then, the user goes to the location I in
the network and asks DI for the value in the jqth index from the oblivious database
it holds. He then receives E(Di)jq and computes E(Di)jq e z, = Diq = bq. All the
communication with P R and S are done through the PIR scheme so that P and R
do not know the user's query and S does not know the user's database.
* U PIR S: i, and S PIR U NEW - LOC(i) = 1.
* U~' Pt: q, and Pl P U: jq.
* U_-- RI: q, and R,1 R. U: Xq.
* UI_ rctD: jq, and D PIR + U: E(Di)j, = Xq bq.
* U decrypts by computing (x, @ bq) e Xq = bq.
Since Dl does not know whose oblivious database it holds, it does not know which
database the user is querying. In addition, since Di does not know which database
holds its encrypted contents, it will not be able to know whether the user is asking it
a question. In addition, the server does not know the user's query because the PIR
scheme is their means of communication.
8.2.3 Assumptions
We hold the same assumptions about the databases as we did in the oblivious database
scheme. In addition, we assume that all the databases do not communicate with the
server according to the No Communication assumption which means that they are
not even allowed to talk to the server by pretending to be a user or in any other way.
The sever does not communicate with the database according to the No messages
assumption.
8.2.4 Proofs
Claim 21 (Security:) Database Dj cannot decide that E(Di) is the encryption of
Di: E(Di) is uniformly distributed over all possible D's.
Proof: Given the view of Dj E(Di) can be the encryption of each D with the
same probability. The probability that a certain D is the database that is encrypted
depends on the appropriate P's and R's that would compute E from that D. For each
database D, Dj can produce the same number of pairs R and P that would encrypt
D to E(Di). The number of pairs is the same as the number of possible P's, because
for every P there is exactly one R which encrypts D into E and it is possible to find
an R for every P that would encrypt D to E. All the possible pairs are the same
probability because each P and R are chosen independently and randomly. This is
independent of D. Therefore, each D has the same probability of being the one that
is encrypted. So E is uniformly distributed over all D's.
In addition to hiding the user's identity, the database DI is not able to find which
query q the user is asking because the user asks jq and receives xq, bq which gives
DI no information about the value of bq, or the location of q.
Claim 22 Correctness: At the end of the scheme the user gets bq if the underlying
PIR scheme is correct.
Proof: The correctness of this scheme is trivial. Since the server S distributes the
encryptions, the user gets the correct new location from S, based on the correctness
of the PIR scheme used. The user then gets the correct new location of the index q
from Pi, and the correct xq from Ri for the same reasons. Finally the user asks for
the value at E(Di)jq and xors it with xq to obtain bq.
Claim 23 (Communication Complexity:)
The communication complexity is O(log(n)CCPIR(n) + log(m)CCPIR(m)).
Proof: The communication complexity is log(n)CCPIR(n) to get the new location
(of logn bits) of the oblivious database. It is a constant to retrieve the encrypted bit.
The communication complexity is log(m)CCPIR(m) to get the permuted location
of q (of log(m) bits). The communication complexity is CCPIR(m) to get the ran-
dom bit from R. Over all the communication complexity is O(log(n)CCPIR(n) +
log(m)CCPIR(m)).
At setup time the server has to send n databases which is communication com-
plexity n * m.
Chapter 9
Future Work
* Repetitions: The schemes in this thesis were proven to be secure for one applica-
tion of the protocol. However, for the application of those schemes it is natural
that they work for multiple executions as well. Since restarting the scheme in
every execution is too expensive because of the setup time, we would like to
guarantee that our scheme will also work for consecutive queries.
* Removing the No Communication assumption: In order for our scheme to be
secure we must assume that certain databases must not communicate with
others by any means. We would like to relax this assumption and allow for
the databases to communicate as a user for example, but still forbid them from
sending extra messages.
* Reducing communication Complexity even further.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
In this thesis we introduced and solved three privacy problems in Secure database
access protocols: Database Privacy, the Data Replication Problem, and the Secure
user Identity problem. Database Privacy is concerned with keeping the databases
information secure from the user. The Data Replication problem deals with a new
security concern for databases that emanates from the need to replicate and distribute
their contents in order to achieve security for the user. The Secure user ID problem
is concerned with keeping private the user's identity, so that no information can be
associated with or learned about that identity.
We solve those problems by using our scheme for communication between a user,
a database and auxiliary databases whose contents are not dependent on the original
database. This protocol allows the user to keep his query secret from the databases,
and allows the database to keep its data secret from the auxiliary databases and
from the user (except for the value of the particular query). We also showed how to
extend that scheme into a protocol for a network of databases that solves the Secure
ID problem. Those protocols rely on no cryptographic assumptions and maintain
sublinear communication complexity in the size of the database.
We showed two reductions:
Theorem: For any k > 2 given any Private Information Retrieval k-database
scheme for n data bits with communication complexity R(k, n) there exists a private-
data-distribution and database private 2k-database scheme with communication com-
plexity O(R(k, n) log(n)) where each database holds O(n) bits.
Theorem: For any k > 2 given any retrieval k-database scheme for n data bits with
communication complexity R(k, n) there exists a no-data-distribution and database
private 2k-database scheme with communication complexity O(R(k, n) log(n)) where
each database holds O(n) bits.
In addition, we solve the Secure ID problem by presenting a protocol for a network
of a user U, n databases of size m with an additional server S. A database in the
network does not know whether U asked him a query or asked a query from another
databases. Therefore, we say that he does not know the identity of the users that are
querying him. The communication complexity of that scheme is O(log(n)R(n, kl) +
log(m)R(m, k2)) for constants k1 and k2.
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